The European Commission has, with its new sanctions against Russia, proposed a mechanism for the first time that can exclude entire countries from crypto services. Their 21st package additionally imposes transaction bans on eleven crypto platforms accused of sanctions evasion.
The EU sanctions regime against Russia consists of packages adopted on a rolling basis, combining trade restrictions, financial sanctions and the designation of individual entities. The Commission drafts the measures, whereas the Council of the 27 member states enacts them unanimously. Since the invasion in 2022, package has followed package, yet the crypto sector entered the focus only late. With the 21st package presented in June 2026, crypto platforms finally appear as the target of a standalone third-country instrument rather than merely as an appendix to financial designations. The background comes from Chainalysis data: sanctions evasion via crypto rose to 104 billion USD in 2025, an increase of 694 percent compared to the previous year.
Subscribe to our newsletter
The best articles of the week, directly delivered into your mailbox.
Crypto sanctions against Russia: what the third-country ban means
The 21st package contains, for the first time, the option of a full ban on crypto services toward third countries. Until now, the Union had imposed transaction bans on individual firms. In future, however, an entire country could be cut off from regulated EU crypto activity, for example if it tolerates platforms used for sanctions evasion. Specifically, the proposal targets eleven crypto platforms as well as 20 banks, crypto firms and oil traders in third countries. In addition, it adds transaction bans against 31 further Russian banks. As a result, the scope shifts: at the center now stands not the individual entity but the jurisdiction that hosts it.
Before the instrument takes effect, the Council of the EU must adopt it unanimously, meaning all 27 member states must agree. The escalation path follows a clear line. October's 19th package first designated a crypto asset directly with A7A5 and effectively created a full MiCAR ban toward Russia. The 20th package of April 2026 then extended the ban to the entire Russian and Belarusian CASP ecosystem, covering 120 individual designations as well as 46 additional shadow-fleet vessels. Additionally, RUBx and the digital ruble joined A7A5 as prohibited assets. The preventive ban on the state digital currency already took hold before Russia could complete its planned rollout in September 2026.
"A7A5 was created with Russian state support and has become a prominent instrument for financing activities that support the war of aggression." - EU Council, press release on the 19th sanctions package
Garantex successors fill the gap
Why a country-based instrument became necessary at all is shown by the history of Garantex. The once-largest Russian crypto exchange had processed over 100 million USD in criminal transactions from ransomware and the darknet since 2019 and was sanctioned by OFAC in 2022. In March 2025, US, German and Finnish authorities seized the domains and froze over 26 million USD. Tether additionally blocked around 28 million USD in USDT held on Garantex addresses. Shortly afterward, the US Department of Justice unsealed indictments against the executives Aleksandr Mira Serda and Aleksej Besciokov, who was arrested in India. The operation did not disappear, however, but moved on: Garantex transferred its customer base and balances to the successor Grinex, which had already been founded in Kyrgyzstan in December 2024.
In February 2026, the blockchain analytics company Elliptic identified five further exchanges that had moved into the emerging gap: Bitpapa, ABCeX, Exmo, Rapira and Aifory Pro. ABCeX is revealing, as it operated from Moscow's Federation Tower, the same building that Garantex had previously used, while processing at least 11 billion USD. Exmo, meanwhile, claimed to have left the Russian market after the outbreak of war in 2022, yet continued to share wallet infrastructure with the Russian operation and transferred over 19.5 million USD to sanctioned exchanges. Rapira likewise routed more than 72 million USD to the sanctioned exchange Grinex. The scaling of this network can finally be read off the ruble-backed stablecoin A7A5, which processed a total of 93.3 billion USD in 2025. According to Chainalysis, the A7 network behind it moved over 90 billion USD into the Russian economy, more than half of Russia's annual military budget.
UK leads with its own crypto sanctions
The EU proposal does not stand in isolation but fits into a coordinated Western framework. As early as August 2025, the US Treasury, through OFAC, designated Grinex, the A7 entities, the A7A5 issuer Old Vector and Garantex founder Sergey Mendeleev. The British OFSI followed a few days later with sanctions against Grinex and Old Vector. Previously, the FCDO had already first sanctioned A7 LLC in May 2025 for supporting Russia's war of aggression. This sequence therefore shows how closely the authorities coordinate their designations along the same actors.
In May 2026, the United Kingdom tightened its course further and targeted the stablecoin A7A5 as well as the exchange HTX, formerly Huobi. The measure additionally hit the platforms ABCeX and Exmo already named by Elliptic, as well as Georgian firms. Because the names of the eleven EU platforms are not yet public, it can only be said that both authorities are moving against the same evasion channels. Notably, several of these platforms remained active despite repeated designations: OFAC sanctioned Bitpapa as early as March 2024, yet the platform continued to route around 9.7 percent of its outgoing crypto flows directly to sanctioned entities. This persistence shows a coordinated transatlantic line, with the EU choosing the most far-reaching variant through the third-country mechanism.
Russia's crypto ecosystem as the backdrop to the EU sanctions
The actual driver behind the new instrument lies in the architecture of the evasion networks. A7A5 emerged at the end of January 2025, only weeks before the Garantex takedown, and holds its reserves at the sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank. Behind the token stands A7 LLC, a payment platform owned by the sanctioned Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and that same Promsvyazbank.
Garantex credited its users with A7A5 tokens equivalent to frozen balances, which were subsequently tradable on Grinex. Even after sanctions, the network therefore remained functional, until Grinex ceased operations in April 2026 following a claimed cyberattack with a loss of around 13 million USD. The company blamed Western intelligence services. On-chain data shows, however, that the withdrawn stablecoins were unusually swapped for Tron via a decentralized exchange.
The 21st package does not address these gaps through crypto assets alone. Additionally, it lists 30 further vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, beyond the 632 already sanctioned, and for the first time also captures support vessels as well as infrastructure such as ports and refineries. Furthermore, Brussels intends to ban the sale of LNG tankers to Russia. This breadth signals that Brussels is targeting the entire evasion infrastructure.
