A7A5 is a ruble-backed stablecoin whose reserves, according to the US Treasury, consist 1:1 of ruble deposits at Russia's Promsvyazbank. Old Vector, a company registered in Kyrgyzstan, issues the token on Ethereum and Tron. Trading takes place mainly on the Grinex exchange.
The token appeared in January 2025. Behind it sits a web of companies: the settlement platform A7 LLC, the issuer Old Vector and Russia's Promsvyazbank. The forensics firms Elliptic and TRM Labs classify A7A5 as a tool for payments that bypass the Western banking system. For Swiss financial intermediaries, A7A5 is therefore primarily a matter for anti-money-laundering controls and sanctions screening, not for trading.
Who issues A7A5 and how the token is backed
According to an analysis by Elliptic, the issuer of A7A5 is Old Vector, a company registered in Kyrgyzstan. The stablecoin runs on Ethereum and Tron. Each A7A5 is said to be backed 1:1 by ruble deposits at Promsvyazbank, a Russian state bank. That bank, according to the US Treasury, finances the country's defense sector and consequently appears on the American sanctions list. Moreover, the issuer and the trading venue have their registered seat in Kyrgyzstan, not in Russia.
Settlement runs through A7 LLC, an underlying platform for cross-border payments. According to the US Treasury, businessman Ilan Shor owns 51% of that platform. He holds the same share in its subsidiaries A71 and A7 Agent. The same announcement cites a conviction of Shor for the theft of USD 1 billion from three Moldovan banks. Both statements about the ownership structure thus come from government announcements, not from issuer documents.
How a payment via A7A5 works
TRM Labs describes the process as a fixed pattern. First, a Russian actor deposits rubles at Promsvyazbank and receives A7A5 tokens from Old Vector in return. Subsequently, the tokens move via Ethereum or Tron to a counterparty outside Russia. The payment thus does not pass through the banking system or SWIFT. There the counterparty swaps them on Grinex into USDT, which the exchange lists in the A7A5/USDT pair. Finally, the counterparty converts USDT into local currency or other assets. As a result, no sanctioned Russian bank appears as a direct payment party on the cross-border leg. Ultimately, the token replaces the correspondent banking relationship on the way from the ruble into a foreign currency.
Ethereum and Tron are public networks, so anyone outside can measure every transfer. Grinex is the central hub of this channel, a centralized exchange registered in Kyrgyzstan. In its sanctions rationale, the UK government quantified the A7A5 volume moved through a dedicated exchange. It reached USD 9.3 billion within four months. However, that figure describes the position as of August 2025 and is not a running metric. The channel works only as long as a counterparty is willing to swap A7A5 for USDT.
From Garantex to Grinex
The main trading venue for A7A5 emerged from the shut-down exchange Garantex. According to the US Department of Justice, Garantex served to process proceeds from cybercrime. Yet OFAC had already sanctioned the exchange years before its shutdown.
Subsequently, the Department of Justice and the US Secret Service seized the Garantex domains, coordinated with Germany and Finland. At the same time, US authorities charged the administrators Aleksej Besciokov and Aleksandr Mira Serda. The count was conspiracy to commit money laundering. Furthermore, prosecutors charged Besciokov with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Tether, working with the Secret Service, froze USD 23 million in balances tied to transactions on the sanctioned exchange.
According to TRM Labs, former Garantex staff then founded Grinex. That exchange became the main venue for A7A5. The token itself remained untouched by the domain seizure. That is because it sits on public blockchains, not on the servers of an exchange. Legally, however, Garantex and Grinex are separate targets with their own listing dates. Shutting down one thus did not end trading. Accordingly, the subsequent sanctions decisions targeted Grinex.
Is the stablecoin A7A5 sanctioned?
Several authorities have brought A7A5 or the network behind it within the scope of their measures. The relevant bodies are the US Treasury, the British OFSI, the Council of the EU and the Swiss Federal Council. With its 19th sanctions package, the EU listed the token in Annex LIII. That listing prohibits transactions in A7A5 within the single market. Listing a token goes further than listing a company. After all, it attaches to the instrument and not to the legal entity. The American and the British measures, by contrast, target the issuer, the trading venues and the individuals involved.
| Date | Authority | Measure |
|---|---|---|
| April 2022 | US OFAC | First sanctioning of Garantex |
| 6 and 7 March 2025 | US Department of Justice, US Secret Service | Seizure of the Garantex domains, indictment of two administrators |
| 14 August 2025 | US OFAC | Sanctioning of Old Vector, A7 LLC, A71 and A7 Agent |
| 20 August 2025 | UK OFSI | Sanctioning of Grinex LLC, Old Vector LLC and Capital Bank of Central Asia |
| 23 October 2025 | Council of the EU | 19th sanctions package listing A7A5 in Annex LIII as well as Grinex, Old Vector and A7 LLC |
| 25 November 2025 | EU | Start of the transaction ban on A7A5 |
| 25 February 2026 | Swiss Federal Council | Adoption of the further EU measures, in force from 26 February 2026 |
For Switzerland, the decisive act is the Federal Council decision of 25 February 2026. It entered into force the following day. It adopts the further measures of the EU package and prohibits all crypto services to Russian nationals and companies. In addition, it bans transactions in certain ruble-backed crypto assets, such as the stablecoin A7A5. A7A5 is thus the named example of a category there, not the sole object of the ban. The legal basis is the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine. AS 2026 92 contains the amendment.
According to the FINMA sanctions notice, the Swiss sanctions list matches that of the EU. Financial intermediaries also report hits to SECO, as the same notice points out. Overall, all listed measures remain in force, as of August 2026.
How A7A5 differs from the digital ruble
A7A5 is not central bank money. Old Vector is a private company. According to the US Treasury, the backing consists 1:1 of ruble balances at a state-owned commercial bank. A digital ruble, however, would be a liability of the central bank. Russia's central bank runs its project for such a digital ruble separately from A7A5. Although both track the ruble, they differ in the issuer and in their legal nature.
Nor is A7A5 a dollar-backed stablecoin. Its reference value is the ruble. In trading, it usually serves as an intermediate step on the way into USDT. Besides the ruble exchange rate, its value depends on whether the claimed ruble backing actually exists. The trading universe remains comparatively narrow, because the token trades essentially only on Grinex and related Russia-linked exchanges.









